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Time is Money: Disentangling Higher Education Cost-
Sharing and Commodification through Deferred 
Graduate Retirement 
Abstract 
Current higher education policy debates in Europe are increasingly focusing on raising the 
share of private funding. To date, policy proposals have centred on a relatively small 
number of alternatives, namely full public funding, tuition fees, either up-front or delayed 
and income-contingent, or a surtax on graduate incomes. Here, I present an alternative that, 
to my knowledge, has not been suggested previously, but sidesteps some important 
objections against other forms of private contributions. The basic idea explored here is to 
increase the statutory retirement age for higher education graduates relative to non-
graduates. In principle, the resulting decrease in future public pension liabilities can be 
converted into increased funds for present spending on higher education. In this first 
discussion of the above proposal I consider important caveats, perform an order-of-
magnitude estimate of whether the financial implications of Deferred Graduate Retirement 
(DGR) are comparable to those of tuition fees, and discuss advantages and disadvantages 
compared to more established policy options. I conclude that, at least in the continental 
European context, DGR promises a number of economically and politically desirable 
properties compared to established alternatives, and deserves more serious investigation. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction 
Cost sharing is ‘both a statement of fact—that is, that the costs of higher education are 
shared among stakeholders—and also a reference to a policy shift of some of these costs 
from a predominant (sometimes a virtually exclusive) reliance on governments’ (Altbach 
et al, 2009, 73). To date, such debates have centered exclusively on a relatively small 
number of policy instruments, namely full public funding, tuition fees, either up-front or 
delayed and income-contingent, or a surtax on graduate incomes. 
Here, I show that alternative schemes are conceivable that could sidestep some important 
objections against other forms of private contributions. This includes both the ‘the 
devilishly difficult’ (Johnstone, 2000, 1) challenge of not discouraging participation among 
less advantaged students, and fundamental concerns regarding the compatibility of 
students-as-customers with the core values of higher education (Tilak, 2009; Williams, 
2014). Indeed, a rejection of commodification of education and an ensuing 
commercialization of the HE sector is one of the main objections to cost-sharing, even 
though these issues are distinct both in theory and – as the present contribution aims to 
show – potentially even in practice.  
One possibility, explored here, is to raise the statutory retirement age for higher education 
(HE) graduates relative to non-graduates. In principle, the decrease in public pension 
liabilities is convertible into increased present spending on HE. In the following, such a 
scheme is termed Deferred Graduate Retirement (DGR). This idea is most relevant where 
public pensions are substantial, and the private contribution to HE funding is not already 
comparable to public funding, implying a focus on OECD member countries, especially 
continental European ones. These provide the most fertile ground for DGR with their 
relatively generous publicly-funded pensions, and limited existing reliance on tuition fees 
(and large resistance to them).   
Strictly economically, DGR may theoretically be approximated by a graduate tax of 
appropriate design: reduced pension at constant contributions have a pure accounting 
equivalent in increased contributions at constant benefits. However, such a view is too 
limited. For one, in terms of the economic implications of mandating one or the other 
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within a framework of endogeneous decisions regarding labour supply, for example. But 
also in that such a limited view ignores real-life cognitive and behavioural effects. In 
relation to HE participation, manifest behaviour is well-documented to deviate from strictly 
economic rationality. This has been noted with respect to mobility (Wakeling and Jefferies, 
2013), take-up of financial aid or the repayment schedule of student debt (Chowdry et al., 
2012), and the ‘haphazard post-secondary choice process’ in general (Scott-Clayton, 2013, 
75). In his study of decision-making among HE applicants, Usher (2010) found ‘there was 
not a single case of a student being able to show in concrete terms that they had appraised 
their chosen HE options in terms of both costs and benefits’ (p 69). Policy-making with 
respect to HE funding is likewise ‘less the result of rational analyses and more the outcome 
of negotiation among stakeholders with competing interests’ (Marcucci, 2013, 9). It 
matters how issues are framed, communicated, and justified (Usher, 2010). Accordingly, 
policies that are equivalent in accounting terms can interact quite differently with 
perceptions, attitudes, and actual participation decisions. 
Naturally, there is no empirical evidence yet on how prospective HE entrants perceive and 
respond to the idea of DGR. However, given well-known general cognitive biases (e.g. 
‘sticker price shock’, or ‘hyperbolic discounting’) it seems highly likely that DGR will 
have a different effect on HE participation behaviour than fees or a graduate tax. To make 
the case why DGR might actually be preferable, it is therefore necessary to discuss the 
issue in terms of HE policy, not of formal public welfare economics. In a different context, 
the financial feasibility of the policy would be a necessary ‘box to tick’, but the potential 
effects of different HE financing instruments on aggregate welfare, human capital 
investment, or labour supply, say, would take centre stage. The modest present aim is 
merely to examine whether any of the likely effects are so obviously undesirable as to 
eliminate DGR from further consideration. 
The presentation is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines major lines of criticism of 
existing cost-sharing instruments, in order to anticipate the standards that DGR will be 
measured against. The characteristics of the DGR scheme are then outlined and explained 
in Section 3, in particular the way it represents an increase in private contributions that is 
only weakly linked to HE commercialization, if at all. Section 4 provides a rough order-of-
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magnitude calculation to establish the potential financial appropriateness of the scheme, 
and points to possible directions for a more detailed economic analysis. I conclude by 
discussing in Section 5 the expected effects of DGR on the HE system and by speculating 
on the scheme’s policy implications. 
2 Desiderata for Cost-Sharing Instruments 
Academic and policy discourses focus on a very limited number of HE financing 
instruments in varying the share of private contributions: full public funding, up-front fees, 
delayed income-contingent fees, and a graduate tax. A succinct overview of the defining 
characteristics of these is provided by Johnstone (2004), for example. 
In practice, fees coexist with subsidies and a mixture of grants and loans, which in turn 
might be subject to income-contingent repayment. The boundaries between instruments 
may be blurred, depending on the precise modalities, with many student loan schemes 
including a ‘hidden grant’ component (Shen and Ziderman, 2008), for instance. 
Not least because these policies rarely exist in their ‘pure’ form, rather than retrace the 
arguments voiced for and against individual instruments and attempt to arbitrate between 
them, I leap straight to extracting desiderata for an ‘ideal’ cost-sharing instrument. These 
are requirements implicitly or explicitly appealed to in debates on cost-sharing and thereby 
provide the criteria against which DGR can be assessed. 
Note that students' living expenses are not considered here. Such indirect costs of HE are 
arguably the largest cost factor, and accordingly there is a case for student loans even in 
the absence of fees, and for grants for disadvantaged groups. However, universal 
unconditional grants covering the full living cost for HE students would clearly be socially 
regressive. Their complete absence from serious policy discussion shows that there is little 
question that, in principle, living expenses are a private cost.  In this sense, the issue of 
living expenses is outside the boundary of disagreement about the appropriate amount of 
cost-sharing in HE that DGR seeks to address.  
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2.1 Equality of opportunity: Student choice unconstrained by 
socio-economic status 
It is generally agreed that fees can only be justified in the presence of student loans and 
grants, at least for those otherwise least able to afford enrolment. This includes fee 
proponents operating within a (neo-)classical paradigm (because optimal HE investment 
an absence of liquidity constraints) even if in practice the first part of the ‘high fees, high 
aid’ formula has been implemented much more readily than the second (Hossler et al., 
1997). 
Even under conditions where fees are a financially sound investment, they may represent 
a psychological obstacle for potential students, and this effect may disproportionally affect 
those from low socio-economic status (SES) backgrounds. Complex cultural factors lie 
behind the low participation of disadvantaged groups in HE (Biffl and Issac, 2002). 
Scholarships and grants have to over-compensate fees in order to counter the psychological 
barrier to enrolment created by fees (Vossensteyn, 1999). Indeed, disadvantaged students 
are known to be more price-averse, more debt-averse, and are less confident they will 
successfully graduate (Asplund at al, 2008), even if some of these characteristics are shared 
by marginal potential entrants generally, independently of social background (Davies et 
al., 2009; Mangan et al., 2010). 
These observations are only superficially contradicted by studies showing surprisingly 
little impact of fees on HE demand (Wakeling and Jefferies; 2013), including among the 
disadvantaged (Harrison, 2011; Whitty et al. 2015). The deterrent effect may be 
underestimated if the potential endogeneity of tuition fees is ignored (Neill, 2009). 
Moreover, disadvantaged students may be negatively affected by fees in terms of 
compromising their choice of institution or subject, rather than their overall decision to 
study (Hutchings, 2003; Callender and Jackson, 2005, 2008; Usher, 2010). 
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2.2 Pooling the risk of inability to pay 
Even deferred fees may unduly deter potential entrants from enrolment if they question 
their ability to afford the charge even after graduation. Taking the ability to pay into 
account motivates income-contingent repayment, allowing for fluctuations in income and 
periods of hardship (Barr, 2004). Graduate tax schemes and income-contingent loans both 
share this characteristic, justifiable both on economic and social justice grounds. Indeed, 
insurance against uncertainty is a welfare value as such, especially with respect to 
education (Barr, 2001). 
Income-contingent repayment implies a risk of default. Some graduates may leave the 
labour force, or not achieve higher incomes than the average non-graduate. This risk 
premium is non-negligible, estimated to contribute between 2.5 and 3 points to the interest 
rate on the loan (Gerard and Vandenberghe, 2007). This premium is either pooled among 
graduates (if priced into repayments) or shared with the public (given an interest-rate 
subsidy). Risk pooling is critical because, while the pattern that graduates enjoy higher 
average incomes is highly robust, the variation in individual incomes does not necessarily 
decreases with more education (Hartog et al, 2007). 
However, risk pooling creates the hazard of ‘adverse selection’, if those most likely to 
repay opt out in favour of up-front payment. The pool of remaining borrowers then has an 
above-average risk of default, increasing the risk premium, and providing an even greater 
incentive for those with low individual risk to opt out. This dynamic is to be avoided. 
Higher income taxation (incl. quasi-taxation, such as an income-contingent loan 
repayment) is expected to decrease the labour supply (Fraja, 2002). In other words, 
graduate tax (and potentially income-contingent loans too) create a disincentive to work, 
which should be minimised. 
2.3 Moderately progressive redistribution 
An intensely debated question is whether public funding for HE implies a reverse subsidy 
from low-income tax payers to middle-class families, whose children are more likely to 
benefit (Dabla-Norris and Gradstein, 2004). Empirical evidence remains ambiguous 
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(Asplund et al, 2008; Callan et al, 2008), but let us note that a HE cost-sharing instrument 
should certainly not be prima facie regressive. 
Still, private contributions should not be disproportionate to the benefit received. One 
reason that despite conceptual appeal a pure graduate tax has nowhere been implemented 
(Asplund et al, 2008) is that high earners would ‘repay’ a total amount vastly exceeding 
the cost of their own instruction. Apart from increasing the risk of adverse selection, even 
if such a significant income transfer is deemed desirable it should be pursued within the 
scope of an explicit income policy, not implicitly through HE funding (Vandenberghe and 
Debande, 2007). Indeed, theoretical results suggest that ‘pursuing redistributive goals 
using education policies is bound to have a substantial cost in terms of the sub-optimality 
of the education policy’ (Fraja, 2002). 
2.4 Separation of cost-sharing and marketization 
Cost-sharing potentially affects the nature of HE governance and the relationship between 
students, their teachers, and HE institutions (HEIs) in ways that might or might not be 
desired depending on political persuasion. Substantial tuition fees compel potential 
students to estimate their future income under different enrolment options (Debande, 
2004), and possibly to obtain a loan. Institutions may need to introduce new administrative 
and financial processes if they collect the fees themselves, and if fees are variable, make 
marketing decisions and assess the relative profitability of different courses. 
The justification of tuition fees appeals to economic arguments, namely that they correct 
incentives for sub-optimal investment in human capital, as well as fiscal ones, namely to 
relieve pressure on severely constrained public budgets. Moreover, proponents of fees also 
appeal to the expectation that the accompanying changes in institutional management will 
improve efficiency (Johnstone, 2004). As paying customers, students can expect and 
demand better quality of service from HEIs, who become more responsive to student needs, 
the argument goes. 
Actually, a consumerist perspective is far from universal among students even in the UK, 
most of whom express “mixed, almost ambivalent position on the consumerism of higher 
education” (Tomlinson 2016, 10, see also Saunders, 2014). Moreover, the student-as-
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consumer approach may fail even on its own terms, with some evidence suggesting it is 
associated with lower academic performance (Bunce et al. 2016). Students themselves are 
concerned that it might signal ‘lower intellectual merit; which in turn could potentially 
devalue the social and economic status of their degree’ (Tomlinson 2016, 12). 
More fundamental are concerns that commercialising HEIs undermines their ethos and core 
mission as places of higher learning (McMillan and Cheney, 1996; Teixeira and Koryakina, 
2013) and their ‘higher purpose’ to contribute to social inclusiveness and justice (Schwartz, 
2011), and that as hybrid institutions ‘neither scientific nor commercial goals can be 
fulfilled properly’ (Häyrinen-Alestalo and Peltola, 2006, 276). 
Given its contentious nature, it is advantageous to disentangle marketization from cost-
sharing as such. Indeed, shifting the balance between public and private contributions can 
be abstracted from questions regarding the nature of HE and the roles and expectations of 
its actors. A fully publicly-funded voucher scheme could in principle induce market 
competition without increasing effective private contributions (Williams, 1988). 
Conversely, a key property of DGR is that it shifts part of the resource burden from the 
public to the private sector without presupposing or determining any particular model of 
HE governance. 
3 Deferred Graduate Retirement 
DGR does not dominate on all the above criteria, but represents a combination of 
compromises distinct from those of the alternatives. 
3.1 Definition 
DGR consists of raising the retirement age for graduates. For an individual otherwise 
eligible for a state pension at age a, as an HE graduate this would rise to a + x, where a 
value for x between 1 and 3 years seems plausible. This would be the new pension age for 
all purposes, including for the calculation of early retirement benefits. The diminished 
future public liability for pension payments between a and a + x represents a public asset. 
If HE funding remains constant, a ‘pure shift’ from public to private funding has occurred. 
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However, if the asset is ‘cashed in’, the gains must be hypothecated to HE, else we do not 
have a case of DGR as a HE funding instrument. 
This basic principle clearly leaves the actual policy under-determined. For example, will 
the new pension scheduled be (left-)truncated, or shifted? The implications of such details 
are mostly financial. Moreover, note that the fact that the system of pension entitlements 
as a whole is a ‘moving target’ subject to reform does not create any particular problems. 
Whatever the formula for pension entitlements or eligibility is at the time – and however 
complex! – it will use the individual's age as one input, and individuals subject to DGR can 
be treated as being x years younger than their chronological age.   
The concern whether ‘the numbers add up’ and how the cost-sharing implications of DGR 
compare to those of tuition fees, is addressed in Section 4. Presently, the modest aim is to 
introduce the DGR principle in terms of HE policy. In order to simplify the initial 
exposition without getting side-tracked prematurely, a stylised pension system is assumed, 
fully public, ‘pay as you go’, and where retirement timing is driven by statutory age limits. 
Further below, I discuss some implications of relaxing these assumptions. 
3.2 Distinctiveness 
DGR may appear equivalent to charging fees, but allowing individuals to borrow against 
their future pension stream, while constraining the use of those funds. However, at the time 
of university entry, individuals do not yet command any personal future pension 
entitlements. Only in the aggregate are we confident that their cohort eventually will. As 
mentioned, theoretically the closest economic equivalent to DGR would be a graduate tax 
labelled as a higher pension contribution at constant benefits. However, as discussed 
further below, the behavioural incentives are likely rather different. 
In the context pension sustainability and equity, Harper et al (2011) do note the idea of 
raising the state pension age for graduates, but only as an indirect scheme to approximate 
their objective of linking the state pension age to healthy life expectancy and/or lifetime 
earnings. Education is merely taken as a proxy, so their scheme differs from DGR both in 
purpose and consequence. DGR is independent of whether, for reasons of demographic 
10  
sustainability, the overall ratio of working life and retirement should shift towards the 
former, as long as the graduate/non-graduate differential is maintained. 
What if the eligibility for a state pension derives not (only) from reaching a threshold age, 
but from having worked a given number of years? If study currently counts towards this 
tally, then no longer counting it represents a variant of DGR. Whether in addition the age 
threshold needs to be raised for graduates depends on the relative incidence of the two 
eligibility criteria among graduate retirees. 
The mere existence of an education differential in average de facto retirement age does not 
by itself serve the same purpose as DGR. In an actuarially fair system, such a behavioural 
pattern would imply no financial penalty at all on graduates compared to non-graduates. 
Only a difference in statutory retirement age as the baseline for the calculation of benefits 
does so. 
3.3 Increasing the private cost share vs. increasing available 
funding 
For present purposes, distinguishing ‘public’ and ‘private’ contributions does not refer to 
the amount of choice or the location of decision-making power, but purely to the resource 
burden. As Marginson (2007) has pointed out, this distinction between public and private 
funding does not predetermine whether HE produces a public and/or private good. 
Charging fees ‘is not the same as recommending that students, or their families, should 
bear the costs’ (Williams, 1988). A ‘fees & vouchers’ scheme would therefore still count 
as public funding. Conversely, DGR is a form of private contribution, even though the 
resource reallocation would actually flow from the public purse. 
We must further distinguish between private and individual contributions. DGR represents 
an example of the former, but not the latter, since DGR collectivizes some of the burden. 
This happens at two different levels: in form of risk-pooling within cohort groups, and risk-
shifting to the state. 
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A key observation is that DGR achieves a shift towards private contributions in purely 
economic terms independently of whether the future pension savings are monetized. 
Monetization is only required if DGR is to serve as an instrument of active HE funding. 
Suppose the alternative is the introduction of tuition fees with a commensurate reduction 
in public HE funding, motivated by economic considerations of fairness and incentives, 
rather than as a means to reduce government expenditure. Then DGR would not require 
monetization in order to achieve the former purpose. By contrast, if the aim is to actively 
increase HE resources without straining the government budget, this is only achieved by 
monetizing DGR. To a limited degree such monetization could, however, be achieved 
passively and indirectly, if the reduced future liabilities support a higher credit rating and 
more favourable conditions for government borrowing.  
4 A Preliminary Economic Assessment 
A key question is how the net present value (NPV) of the future public savings under DGR 
compares to the value of tuition fees. This determines both to what extent the relative 
private and public shares of costs have been shifted, and the additional resources that could 
potentially be mobilized for current funding. To calculate the NPV, the future value is 
discounted with a given compounded rate of real interest. The time horizon may be 
approximated by 50 years, corresponding to university entry at 18 and retirement at 68, for 
example. Assessing the implications of a graduate tax or delayed income-contingent fees, 
requires detailed assumptions about incomes, their variance, and their changes with age (to 
the extent that such schemes practically rely on micro-simulation to be analysed). 
Similarly, the NPV of DGR depends on a number of parameters. However, the assumptions 
required for a first approximation are straightforward.  
Table 1 shows the years of retirement deferral whose NPV is equivalent to tuition fees 
under given assumptions regarding: a) the level of fees, b) the interest rate, and c) the value 
of graduate pensions. The scenarios become less favourable in the rightward and downward 
directions. The appropriateness and robustness of these assumptions is elaborated in the 
following.  
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With respect to fees, for simplicity I consider EUR 10,000 to represent the stylised ‘full 
cost’ fee, close to the OECD average tertiary institution expenditure per student per annum 
(OECD, 2010). Given that the cost of instruction is typically only two thirds of the overall 
institution cost (the latter including research spending, for example) (Bevc and Uršič, 
2008), this is something of an overestimate. Anyhow, full cost recovery is not sought by 
most European governments, so DGR would in reality need to cover only between 10 and 
50 percent of this to serve as an alternative to tuition fees. For convenience, EUR 3,000 per 
student per annum, currently exceeded within the EU only in the UK (although a punitive 
fee for long-term students at this level is under discussion in the Netherlands) is the stylised 
‘high’ level of fees. ‘Moderate fees’ will be a shorthand for EUR 1,000 per student per 
annum. A four-year degree is therefore priced at EUR 40,000 (full-cost), EUR 12,000 
(high), and EUR 4,000 (moderate) respectively. 
With respect to the interest rate, the central scenario of a nominal annual interest rate of 4 
percent is in line with existing literature (e.g. Vandenberghe and Debande, 2007). 
Arguably, this errs on the side of caution. DGR is less attractive to governments 
experiencing financial crisis, since it does not by itself yield liquid funds (although in any 
case ‘cost recovery will not be a “quick fix” for resource shortfalls’ (ADB 2009, 21)). The 
relevant interest rate, for a country with good credit rating, should therefore be towards the 
low end of the historic range of European government bonds. In this sense, 4 percent is a 
soundly conservative parameter. This is reflected in the alternative 2 percent scenario. 
While 4 percent is already conservative for the reason stated, the implications of an 
exceedingly pessimistic scenario assuming 6 percent nominal interest are also shown.  
Finally, we need to consider the value of graduate pensions, Across the EU and OECD, 
mandatory pensions at retirement on average replace close to 60 percent of the final salary 
(theoretical gross replacement rate), a figure not expected to change dramatically over the 
coming decades (EU, 2010; OECD, 2009). Conveniently, at 1 percent inflation, 60 percent 
is also approximately the inflation adjustment over 50 years. We can therefore express our 
assumption on the average nominal graduate pension in 50 years’ time in terms of the 
average final graduate salary just before retirement today. For many European countries, 
the range of EUR 30-40,000 seems plausible, especially where even the average wage is 
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higher (OECD, 2011). The assumption for the inflation rate is conservative. The European 
Central Bank target rate is closer to 2 percent. Note that higher inflation at a given nominal 
interest rate works in favour of DGR, because it is the real interest that lowers its value. 
Assuming 2 percent inflation instead of 1 percent, while maintaining 4 percent nominal 
interest, would be similar in its effect to lowering the nominal interest rate from 4 to 2.5. 
 Table 1: Approximate number of years by which graduate retirement would have to be deferred to substitute for stated annual fees for a four-year-degree   fees   Moderate EUR 1,000 per annum 
High EUR 3,000 per annum 
Full EUR 10,000 per annum   Value of graduate year in the labour force instead of retirement (nominal EUR) nominal interest NPV of nominal EUR 10,000  graduate pension 
 40,000  30,000  40,000  30,000  40,000  30,000 
2  3,715 <0.5 <0.5 <1 1 2.5 3.5 4  1,407 <1 1 2 3 7 9.5 6  543 2 2.5 5.5 7.5 18 25 
 
Evidently, other important factors add to the financial value of DGR, or detract from it. 
Yet others have indeterminate effects, meaning either its direction depends on the precise 
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values of contextual parameters, or that it would require more elaborate modelling to 
assess. 
On the positive side, saved pension payments are only part of the public savings through 
later retirement. The added value of a longer working life to the economy at large is 
difficult to estimate. At a minimum, there would be additional income tax revenue. 
Graduates at the end of their career will typically have above-average wages. Working with 
the average values for theoretical replacement rates and wages is, in combination, a safe 
assumption. While the theoretical replacement rates are substantially lower for high wage 
earners, the absolute pension value (and therefore the value of DGR) will still be higher. 
For example, a stylised high wage earner with a final salary twice the average will typically 
experience a gross replacement rate that is about 25 percent lower (EU, 2010). Finally, in 
comparison with the cost-shifting effect of fees it is very conservative to take these at their 
face value, as the estimates in Table 1 do. In fact, under typical income-contingent 
repayment, only a fraction of that value is actually shifted from the public to the private 
sector (Chowdry et al., 2012) under the tuition fee alternative. 
On the negative side, if the additional working years raise the pension claims after the 
deferral period, then under DGR graduate pensions would be paid for a shorter time, but 
be slightly higher. Obviously not all graduates would spend the years between their old and 
new retirement age in employment, receiving unemployment benefits or other transfers 
under DGR instead of a pension, partly negating the saving in the latter. 
Additional costs arise in case DGR is to be monetized to serve as an active HE funding 
instrument. The transfer to the HE budget may involve substantial transaction costs, 
especially if the latter is organised at a different level of governance. In Germany, for 
instance, HE funding comes ‘from the budgets of various ministries at federal and state 
level, from nearly all branches of social security, as well as in form of tax breaks of 
different kinds’ (Gwosc and Schwarzenberger, 2009, 342). Moreover, monetizing the 
reduction in future pension liabilities relies on the financial markets. How this particular 
form of asset would be priced is uncertain. In the UK, there were concerns that future 
graduate tax receipts would only fetch 25 percent of their face value on the financial market 
(Browne, 2010, 51). The revenue under DGR is only accessed at the very end, so interest 
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payments on a bond would themselves need to be financed in the meantime. The long time 
horizon to maturity by itself is unexceptional, however, and in line with a recent trend 
towards ‘ultra-long term’ bonds (Hughes and Mackenzie, 2011). 
In sum, since some factors would diminish and others inflate the approximate calculation, 
the latter is neither an obvious over- nor an obvious underestimate. If we accept these 
figures as reasonable first-order approximations, then with reference to the cells in Table 
1 highlighted in the darker shade, we observe the following. In the central scenario, 
deferring graduate retirement by 2 to 3 years would be broadly comparable to high fees. 
For moderate fees, this remains true even under pessimistic assumptions. Conversely, even 
full-cost fees could be approximated under assumptions that are more optimistic, but still 
well within the realm of what is possible. The latter observation is not to justify such a 
scenario as plausible, but does show that with respect to lower levels of fees the conclusions 
are robust.  
To be prudent, let us add an additional margin of error, in order to reflect the uncertainty 
of the estimates, and, in particular, to account for the loss in case DGR is to be monetized 
as an active funding instrument. If we assume that the NPVs are only half of their above 
estimates, this doubles the required years of deferral. With respect to the lightly-shaded 
cells in Table 1, we see that even with a 100 percent margin of error, at most 2 years of 
deferral would match moderate fees under middle-of-the-road assumptions, or even high 
fees under more optimistic ones.  
5 Discussion 
The following explores DGR's general implications for HE along the broad criteria outlined 
in Section 2 and, more speculatively, its promise of policy expedience. 
HE access and choice need not be severely affected. DGR promises to be more acceptable 
to a majority of affected individuals than tuition fees or a graduate tax, both as current 
prospective students and as future retirees. 
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The phenomenon of ‘mental accounting’ for example, suggests students will not frame 
deferred retirement in terms of a financial loss, but as ‘working longer’. That cost is very 
far in the future indeed from the perspective of an 18 or 19-year-old, compared to the 
immediate benefit. Indeed, that prospective students assessment of the costs and benefits 
of HE is focused on the medium term is highlighted by the fact that ‘the expected size of 
the graduate premium’ as a determinant of HE participation can meaningfully be 
operationalised in terms of income at age 30, instead of lifetime income (Davies et al., 
2014). DGR allows ‘borrowing’ money to invest in HE, but without manifesting itself as 
tangible, personal debt with a monetary ‘sticker price’. Students maintain the freedom to 
base their choice of degree on criteria other than income generation. Crucially, this is not 
a matter of ‘duping’ students into an economically irrational choice, but on the contrary, of 
avoiding and/or off-setting cognitive biases that have been blamed for marginal entrants 
being overly reluctant to pursue HE in the face of fees.  
Retirement patterns suggest DGR would also be acceptable to affected individuals as 
prospective retirees. Across OECD countries, tertiary graduates are already consistently 
and significantly more likely to remain economically active at higher ages than non-
graduates (OECD, 2006). The fact that controlling for cohort trends and partnership status 
leaves only a modest difference (Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2005) does not invalidate this 
observation.  
Moreover, although well-designed income-contingent fees should, by definition, not 
constitute an unmanageable burden, repayment overlaps with the ‘rush hour of life’ when 
mortgages and family formation place additional strain on the finances of young adults. By 
contrast, DGR shifts the burden to a time when, towards the end of their career, financial 
independence is at a peak. 
With respect to the insurance characteristics, similar to a pure graduate tax, the amount an 
individual ‘repays’ under DGR is not linked to the cost of their own study (unlike a 
graduate tax, however, there is no risk of vastly disproportionate individual contributions 
(the so-called ‘Mick Jagger effect’ [Barr, 2001]), since state pension entitlements top out 
far below the highest incomes). Instead, a graduate cohort as a group raises the overall 
cost. The risk premium due to individual income uncertainty is thus pooled across all 
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graduates. Through pooling risk within cohorts, as well as shifting onto the state the 
question of whether to attempt a monetization of the future asset, DGR moderates the 
burden of increased cost-sharing on individuals. 
The risk of adverse selection is underdetermined by the minimal definition of DGR. Given 
an opt-out option, those participating in DGR might be biased towards a lower likelihood 
of being economically active and towards lower pensions. Consequently, the amount of 
deferral would have to be greater than if all graduates without exception are subject to 
mandatory DGR. However, graduates from private HEIs not receiving public funds would 
have to be subject to deferred retirement regardless. Assuming this group is more 
privileged on average, this would constitute an additional redistributive measure. 
Otherwise, if DGR only applied to graduates from public HEIs, the adverse selection 
problem would not only rear its head again, but come hand in hand with increasing social 
stratification between public and private HEIs. 
DGR’s distributional implications depend on how the issue is framed. In terms of transfers, 
there is no effective resource flow from non-graduates to graduates that would make the 
scheme evidently inequitable. However, in terms of income distributions with and without 
DGR, its face-value effect is actually regressive. This is because deferring their retirement 
will increase the life-time income of graduates compared to non-graduates. This ignores 
the value of the free time, however. If current retirement behaviour reflects their 
preferences for income versus free time, then imposing DGR may imply a net loss of utility 
for graduates, even in the face of a higher total income. Ultimately, absent detailed 
knowledge of preferences, the distributional implications of DGR are undetermined. 
What is clear is that the private contribution under DGR cannot be borne by privileged 
students’ parents on their behalf. This property increases the distributional merit, and 
potentially makes the policy more attractive in settings, e.g. Scandinavia, where parental 
support is traditionally discouraged. 
A consequence of DGR that ought to appeal to legislators, planners and administrators is 
increased freedom in designing policy and flexibility in implementing it. Under DGR, the 
core effect of shifting the resource burden is isolated from other effects on the HE sector. 
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As long as the only action taken is to increase the statutory retirement age for new 
graduates, the only tangible change is that future public liabilities per graduate have 
diminished. A significant share of the resource burden of HE is thus shifted from the public 
onto private shoulders, but without directly affecting the HE system or educational 
dynamics in any way. At this stage, current flows of public payments to HEIs have neither 
increased nor decreased, and no action whatsoever is required of either prospective students 
or HEIs. From their perspective, the shift in resourced burden is achieved ‘at the stroke of 
a pen’. 
Moreover, because the private contribution under DGR is postponed by a long time, future 
governments may renew their commitment to HE as a public good and waive the retirement 
deferral. Unlike fees or graduate taxes that would be difficult to reimburse decades later, 
DGR constitutes a shift from public to private funding that remains reversible for some 
time, and should therefore be easier to enact. This does, of course, come at the cost that if 
monetization already occurred, this debt would have to be ‘bought back’. Otherwise, 
similar to graduate taxes, the fact they ‘may be abandoned tomorrow by another 
government […] seriously diminishes the[ir] marketable present value’ (Johnstone, 2000, 
6). However, this may be seen as a challenge to design appropriate commitment devices 
rather than a fundamental objection.  
If monetized and the savings redirected to actively increase HE funding, DGR does not 
directly contribute to the sustainability of the pension system. As a pure cost-sharing 
instrument without monetization, the pension system would benefit, however. Either way, 
DGR would have the side-effect of raising the effective average retirement age, thereby 
promote a social norm for later retirement. In addition, even if the savings are diverted, the 
additional receipts resulting from graduate’s additional working years need not be. 
Later retirement for graduates is likely to appear almost self-evidently fair to the general 
public; after all, graduates also enter the labour market later. Arguably, serious study 
constitutes unpaid, but nevertheless economically productive, work. Also, graduates may 
not spend so much less time in working if they suffer less and shorter unemployment. 
Nevertheless, in terms of political feasibility, it is ultimately perceived fairness that matters. 
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The above caveats are unlikely to be able to dent the persuasiveness of the simple formula 
‘enter later, exit later’. 
Differentiated statutory retirement ages are not intrinsically socially unacceptable. 
Differentiation by gender is common, but there are also examples of differentiation 
according to life choices. In the Czech Republic, the retirement age for women is 
contingent on the number of children (OECD, 2009). In extreme cases, changing the 
retirement age for specific occupations may serve purely as an instrument of manpower 
planning (Ganjapure, 2010). A variable pension age has already been injected into the 
policy debate in the context of pension sustainability (Harper et al, 2011), even contingent 
on individual factors much more speculative, such as healthy life expectancy. Anyhow, the 
deferral by one to three years implied by DGR is considerably less than the existing 
variation in state pension age between OECD members. 
An important question is whether the scheme can be actively subverted. The first concern 
relates to mobility, that ‘students could vote with their feet, i.e. study in those countries 
where their financial participation is the most limited and work afterwards where the 
returns to education are the highest’ (Guille, 2002, 429). Even without DGR, ‘a [European] 
harmonisation of funding policies of higher education seems necessary’, therefore (Guille, 
2002, 429). While Brooks and Waters (2013), for instance, see some mobility motivated 
by tuition-fee differentials, there is little evidence of large-scale migration flows induced 
by fee avoidance, even between areas where mobility barriers are particularly low 
(Wakeling and Jefferies, 2013). If anything, some countries exhibiting the least 
‘affordability’ of HE (Vossensteyn, 1999) have among the highest shares of foreign EU 
students, demonstrating that other aspects (language, perceived quality, etc.) outweigh cost 
concerns. Indeed, ‘those with most incentive to escape high-cost tuition fee regimes may 
also be least able (or willing) to be geographically mobile’ (Wakeling and Jefferies 2013, 
p. 18). Anyhow, the share of migrants among the total graduate labour force remains 
relatively small, and by the second half of this century, some kind of ‘common pension 
area’ in the EU may be expected. Indeed, recent EU negotiations on harmonising economic 
governance have explicitly included the subject of pensions (Der Spiegel, 2011). In sum, 
there is little evidence that justifies fears of a mass-phenomenon of students circumventing 
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DGR either by studying elsewhere, or by migrating immediately following graduation. But 
once they have worked in the relevant jurisdiction for some time and accrued pension 
claims, DGR is actually more difficult to avoid than delayed fee repayment or a graduate 
tax, because it is easier to withhold a benefit than to collect a payment. 
The second ‘free riding’ concern is the theoretical moral hazard of students and employers 
colluding to fill graduate jobs with individuals who completed their studies but never 
officially graduated. They would receive salaries slightly lower than certified graduates, 
making the scheme lucrative for both parties. However, this is unrealistic on a grand scale. 
The tactic fails for law, medicine, architecture, engineering, and other regulated 
professions. It would preclude public sector employment. Moreover, the centrality of 
certification arises almost inevitably from the systemic logic of any formal education 
system (Green, 1980). In any case, if the risk of ‘free riding’ is seen as significant, an 
alternative would be to defer the retirement age by a given number of months per semester 
of HE enrolment, since presumably enrolment cannot be avoided in order to benefit from 
the course. Nor can the repayment be evaded by deliberately failing to reach the retirement 
threshold, since the scheme assumes early retirement benefits will be downscaled 
accordingly.  
A number of pertinent questions would require formal economic modelling that is beyond 
the scope of the present expository article. For example, this includes the question whether, 
subject to real-life credit constraints and uncertainty, the DGR scheme creates incentives 
for over or under-investment in HE at the individual or public level if retirement decisions 
are endogenous. A key concern with graduate taxes and income-contingent loan is the 
extent to which they depress the labour supply. Again, a formal analysis of this question 
with respect to DGR is beyond the present scope. However,   unlike the former two 
schemes, earning a higher income is not directly penalised (and thereby disincentivised). 
6 Conclusion 
Clearly, despite combining many attractive characteristics, DGR does not dominate all 
alternatives on all criteria, much less in all settings. Nonetheless, DGR offers a genuinely 
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novel combination of characteristics and therefore potentially presents a true addition to 
the existing policy toolbox. This by itself is a relevant contribution, as the tools currently 
available haven proven too limited to create a broad consensus among the different 
stakeholders and political camps. 
In introducing a novel scheme, it seems necessary to begin with a comprehensive general 
discussion in order to establish the principle, without focusing prematurely on specific 
parameter values. An obvious next step is to fully quantify the factors discussed in Section 
4 based on empirical data and forecasts for specific countries, to arrive at a more robust 
estimate of the net public saving associated with each additional graduate year in the labour 
force. Next, including DGR within a formal life-cycle model with endogenous decisions 
on human capital investment, labour force participation, and retirement will be required to 
deepen our understanding of its implications. 
Many important questions remain to be addressed, and the present contribution has, at best, 
provided a first ‘inventory of issues’. However, none of the most obvious concerns appear 
to deal a death-blow to the idea. Indeed, the concept of a ‘pure’ graduate tax continues to 
be discussed despite general agreement that it is infeasible or even undesirable in practice. 
Income-contingent deferred fee schemes are not only debated, but even implemented, 
despite recognition of the risk that they may well fail to actually generate any meaningful 
net revenue once interest-subsidies, forgiveness-clauses, default, and administrative costs 
are taken into account. Similarly, the proposed scheme of Deferred Graduate Retirement 
does not need to be perfect to merit further investigation at least. By forcing the debate 
outside the settled groove, such investigations may benefit our understanding of the policy 
trade-offs involved even if DGR itself were ultimately rejected as a mere thought 
experiment. In light of the unresolved challenge that ‘equity of participation in higher 
education […] has been solved by no nation, rich or poor, capitalist or socialist’ 
(Heyneman, 1995, 560), broadening the debate is necessary, especially in ways that 
potentially create common ground by disentangling the question of economic burdens and 
incentives at the individual level from institutional commercialization. 
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